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Reflections on Hines v. Davidowitz:
The Future of Obstacle Preemption
Kenneth W. Starr*
For decades, the doctrine of preemption has been a fecund source of
confusion and division. Preemption goes to the heart of our federal system,
a fact which prompted Pepperdine School of Law to attempt to shed some
light on this vitally important arena of constitutional law and public policy.
In April 2005, the School of Law hosted a symposium on the issue of federal
preemption of state tort law, specifically addressing the applicability of state
law to medical drugs and devices.
At one level, the rules as to preemption are reassuringly simple. By
virtue of the Supremacy Clause, embodied in Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution, the power of Congress to preempt state law in an enormous
range of regulatory activity cannot seriously be doubted.' This seems so
manifestly obvious, and indeed so straightforward, that the subject has
sparked limited scholarly, or even practical, treatment.
Accordingly, scholars have fretted that the academy has been content
merely to scratch the surface of this deep and abidingly important subject.
One scholar noted that "[a]lthough as a topic, preemption has largely been
ignored by constitutional law scholars, it is almost certainly the most
frequently used doctrine of constitutional law in practice." 2 Increasingly,
scholars have questioned the easy assumptions that inform much of the
seemingly settled, black-letter law of preemption.3
In this questioning, scholars have rightly lamented that "the Supreme
Court's numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or
* Dean and Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. The Author would like to
thank Audrey Maness and Jamie Chanin for their assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Natureof Preemption,79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
3. See generally Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000)
(arguing that, in contrast to existing belief, "federalism does not admit to a general presumption
against federal preemption of state law.").

analytical pattern." 4 This seems ironic since easy categories are employed,
such as express preemption, in which Congress includes a provision directly
addressing the relationship of federal law to that of the states,5 or conflict
preemption, in which obedience to state law brings about a conflict with
federal law.6

These ostensibly clear categories (albeit filled with their own
interpretive challenges) are complicated by a highly relevant, deliciously
rich concept first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1941 in Hines v.
Davidowitz. 7 It is this case - and its progeny - that provides a deep
reservoir from which to draw the more specific issue that brings this
conference together.
The statute at issue in Hines was Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act,
which required aliens to register once a year for a nominal fee and carry an
identification card.8 Pennsylvania residents brought a representative action
contesting the statutes's constitutionality. 9 The district court agreed with the
plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of the measure on two grounds: the Act
denied equal protection to aliens, and encroached upon federal powers.
After the district court entered judgment, Congress enacted its own
Alien Registration Act. " This federal measure tailored the Supreme Court's
review of Hines, as the Court was required to "pass upon the state Act in
light of the Congressional Act."' 2 As a result, the Court did not address the
lower court's findings; instead, the Court focused solely on whether
congressional action had precluded state action.' 3 A review of the Hines
decision leaves no doubt that a decidedly nationalist vision triumphed. 14
Because no categorical preemption in the traditional sense was to be
found, either in the form of express preemption or conflict preemption, the
Hines Court first reviewed the nature of the regulation in question.' 5 The
Court discussed the importance alien regulation plays in comity to other
nations, and determined that:

4. Id.
5. Of course, numerous complex interpretative questions emerge within this category of
preemption, even when Congress has explicitly spoken. For example, what is the meaning of the
frequently used statutory term "requirements"? When the term is included as an express preemption
provision, does it include not only statutes and regulations, but common law tort actions as well?
6. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (introducing the concept of conflict or
implied preemption).
7. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
8. Id. at 59.
9. See id. at 60.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The federal statute provides for a single registration of aliens, at which time aliens would
produce detailed information and have their fingerprints taken. Id. Such information was to be held
in confidential federal files. Id. The statute required neither that aliens carry an identification card
nor that they exhibit the card to law enforcement. Id. at 60-61.
13. Id. at 62.
14. See id. at 62-63, 73-74.
15. Id.at 62.
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[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined
with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts,
and the state also acts on the same subject, 'the act of Congress, or
the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in
the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." 16
After concluding that state law was subordinate in the arena of alien
regulation, the Court then addressed whether congressional action had
precluded enforcement of the Pennsylvania statute.17 The Court noted that
"[flor many years Congress has provided a broad and comprehensive plan"
with respect to alien regulation.18 In addition, some regulatory provisions
specific to aliens had been routinely rejected by Congress on the basis that
such "requirements were at war with the fundamental principles of our free
government.... ."'9 Such regulations were noticeably absent from the 1940
Federal Alien Registration Act. 20 From this, the Hines Court concluded that
Pennsylvania's law, which included some of these more restrictive
provisions, stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.", 2 1 "Obstacle preemption" thus
was born.
This triumphantly nationalist conclusion by no means went
unchallenged. Three members of the Court dissented, including no lesser
lights than Justice (and future Chief Justice) Harlan Fiske Stone and Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes. 22
The dissent reasoned that because
Congress "may, if such is its will ....subtract from the powers which might
otherwise be exercised by the states," the Court must guard "against such
diminution of state power by vague inferences as to what Congress might
have intended if it had considered the matter or by reference to [the Court's]
own conceptions of [Congressional] policy .. ,23 Because nothing in the
federal enactment made it clear that Congress intended to withdraw power
over aliens from the States, the dissent concluded that it would be wholly
inappropriate for the Court to draw the inference that Congress intended to
create an exclusive registration system. 24 The dissent also emphasized that
16. Id.at 66 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,211 (1824)).
17. Id. at 68-69. It is interesting to note that, in determining whether Pennsylvania's law stands
as an obstacle to the goals of Congress, the Court found it significant that this legislation is in a field
affecting international relations, stating that preemption is "the one aspect of our government that
from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to demand broad national authority."
Id. at 68.
18. Id.
at 69.
19. Id.at71.
20. Id. at72.
21. Id.at 67.
22. See id. at74-81 (Stone, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at74-75.
24. Id. at75.

the federal and state statutes were not inconsistent-an alien could comply
with both.25 In the dissent's view, it was not within the judicial power to
strike down2 6 a state law in the absence of either express or conflict
preemption.
For its part, the Hines majority was keenly aware that there was neither
an express preemption provision nor a conflict between the statute and
federal measures. 27 Traditional preemption-triggering signs were noticeably
lacking. However, the majority determined that the issue of alien
registration was peculiarly suited by its nature to national, not state,
legislation.2 8 The Hines Court was purposefully driving this branch of
constitutional law into the Hamiltonian tradition of national supremacy over
state-centered governance.29
This Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian battleground remains active today. The
nationalist vision embodied in the Hines majority opinion has surely stood
the test of time, but not without its vigorous detractors. The Court has
remained wedded to the Hines methodology, even in an era of textualism
and structuralism in constitutional interpretation. Although the Rehnquist
Court deeply valued anti-federalist principles, the prevailing view on
preemption issues has been (in the main) surprisingly Hamiltonian.
A dramatic and deeply controversial illustration is Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co.30

There, the Court found preemption on Hines v.

Davidowitz grounds. 3' Briefly stated, the case stemmed from a car accident
- Alexis Geier hit a tree while driving her Honda Accord.3 2 She brought a
negligence and product liability action against Honda because the car was
equipped only with a manual shoulder and lap belt, and not with an airbag or
other passive restraint.33 In response to Ms. Geier's state tort law action,
Honda maintained that the complaint was preempted by the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. 34 This argument posed no small
challenge, since the statute contained both an express preemption provision
and a savings clause.35 What room, if any, remained for "obstacle"
preemption?

25. Id. at 79, 81.
26. Id. at 78-81. See also id. at 75 (arguing that the Court should not strike down a state law
concerning police power unless it "plainly and palpably violates some right granted or secured to the
national government by the Constitution or similarly encroaches upon the exercise of some authority
delegated to the United States for the attainment of objects of national concern").
27. Id. at 60-61 (majority opinion).
28. Id. at 73.
29. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 187 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1894)
(stating that Congress has the power to establish a "uniform rule," which precludes a State from
imposing a "distinct rule").
30. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
31. Id. at 881.
32. Id. at 865.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Court noted that a provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988) expressly "pre-empts any
safety standard that is not identical to a federal safety standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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The Geier Court vigorously embraced the Hines methodology,
concluding that the state tort law created an obstacle to the achievement of
national objectives, resulting in an actual conflict between state and federal
measures.3 6 That is, Ms. Geier's tort action depended on her claim that
Honda had a duty to install an airbag.37 The federal regulation, in contrast,
deliberately imposed particular measures designed to increase highway
safety, but allowed for a gradual phase-in period for the requirement of
passive restraints.38 Thus, the vehicle in question (the 1987 Accord) was
compliant under federal standards but was insufficiently equipped to satisfy
more particularistic state standards. Relying on Hines, the Geier Court
concluded that an immediately active statewide airbag requirement would
present an obstacle to the goals sought by the federal regulation, and
therefore state action was preempted. 9
This muscular employment of Hines v. Davidowitz triggered the ire of
Justice Stevens, even though he had paid his respects to the Hines
methodology in his majority opinion in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.4 ' In his
Geier dissent, Justice Stevens maintained that it was inappropriate for the
Court to "[rely] on history and regulatory commentary rather than either
statutory or regulatory text" in determining whether a state law is
preempted. 4' To the contrary, the dissent went on, a presumption of
preemption should obtain.4 2 Such a presumption, the dissent suggested:
serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal judges from
running amok with our potentially boundless (and perhaps
inadequately considered) doctrine of implied conflict pre-emption
based on frustration of purposes-i.e., that state law is pre-empted if
it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the
43
full purposes and objectives of Congress.,

36. Id. at 874.
37. Id.at881.
38. Id. at 879; see id. at 874-81 (providing a detailed description of the federal regulations and
the goals meant to be achieved through these regulations).
39. Id. at 881-82; see also Main R. Scordato, FederalPreemptionof State Tort Claims, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1, 18 (2001) (reasoning that "the viability of a state tort suit as the one at issue in [the
Geier] case could well frustrate this purpose by allowing the states, through the threat of tort
liability, to effectively mandate the immediate blanket installation of airbags.").
40. 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (stating that the FDA could determine if a state law should be preempted on the grounds that the law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress") (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
41. Geier, 529 U.S. at 888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 907-08 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).

Specifically, the dissent suggested that in a case involving
administrative regulations, preemption should occur only when the agency
clearly indicates preemptive intent. 44
Responding to demand for an express statement of preemptive intent,
Justice Breyer, countered for the Geier majority that "one can assume that
Congress or an agency ordinarily would not intend to permit a significant
conflict. ' 45 Even without an express preemption statement, the reasoning
went, the Court should discern preemption when there is a considerable
conflict between federal and state visions.46 The Court majority noted that
"[w]hile we certainly accept the dissent's basic position that a court should
not find pre-emption too readily in the absence of clear evidence of a
conflict, for the reasons set out above we find such evidence here." 47
Geier powerfully illustrates the Court's eager acceptance of the Hines
methodology. Hines, in essence, added a rich (and broad) dimension to
preemption: obstacle preemption continues to act in the ranks alongside
express and conflict preemption.
Application of this extensive and complex grouping brings us to the
topic of the symposium. The articles that follow address one area of
application of preemption, and provide a comprehensive discussion on the
applicability of state law to medical drugs and devices. The articles more
fully apply the concepts adumbrated above, and, more importantly,
meaningfully contribute to the ongoing preemption debate in a vitally
important arena of our national life.
We at Pepperdine University School of Law are grateful to these
distinguished scholars and practitioners for their important contributions to
this enduring conversation in our federal republic.

44. Id. at 908-10. But see id. at 884 (majority opinion) (criticizing the dissent for relying on
cases which involved express preemption but not conflict preemption, which was the type at issue).
45. Id. at 885.
46. Id. at 884-85.
47. Id. at 885 (internal citations omitted).

